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Burns: Burns: Are Costs to Clean Up

ARE COSTS TO CLEAN UP-CLEANUP
COSTS? FEDERAL COURTS REFUSE
TO AGREE ON WHETHER TOXIC
WASTE CLEANUP COSTS ARE
"DAMAGES" UNDER MISSOURI LAW
Jones Truck Lines v. TransportInsurance Co.'

Since the passage of the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability (SUPERFUND) Act 2 in 1980, there has
been an explosion of litigation concerning the extent to which an insured
is covered under his comprehensive general liability (CGL) insurance

1. No. 88-5723 (E.D. Pa. May 10, 1989) (WESTLAW, 1989 WL 49517)
(memorandum on summary judgment) [hereinafter Jones] and (June 28, 1989)
(WESTIAW, 1989 WL 71595) (memorandum of Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law) [hereinafter Jones Memorandum].
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (Supp. V 1987). Section 107 of SUPERFUND
establishes liability for:
(A) all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the United
States Government or a State or an Indian Tribe not inconsistent with
the national contingency plan;
(B) any other necessary costs of response incurred by any other
person consistent with the national contingency plan;
(C) damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural
resources, including the reasonable costs of assessing such injury,
destruction, or loss resulting from such a release ....
42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4) (Supp. V 1987).
3. One commentator described the history of the CGL as follows:
The standard form of comprehensive general liability (CGL) policies
of insurance was first introduced in 1940 and subsequently revised in
1943, 1955, 1966, and 1973. The standard CGL insurance policies
contain uniform language prepared by the National Bureau of
Casualty Underwriters and the Mutual Insurance Rating Bureau and
since 1972, the Insurance Services Office. The policy provides
coverage for a policyholder's legal liability as follows:
The company will pay on behalf of the insured all sums
which the insured shall become legally obligated to pay as
damages because of bodily injury or property damage to
which this [insurance] applies, caused by an occurrence,and
the company shall have the right and duty to defend any
suit against the insured seeking damages on account of
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1990
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policy.4 One of the primary issues in these cases has been whether
CGL policies cover environmental cleanup costs. 5
The policies behind SUPERFUND favor coverage.' One of the
major purposes of SUPERFUND is to promote the speedy, cost-efficient
cleanup of hazardous waste.7 By holding that CGL policies do not cover
cleanup costs, courts thwart this goal by giving an insured incentive not
to immediately clean up contaminated waste. Such holdings encourage
the insured to wait to clean up the contamination until actual damage
has occurred or the insured has been sued.8
Most of the litigation on whether CGL policies cover cleanup costs
has taken place in federal court. But because insurance contract
interpretation is a substantive issue under the Erie9 doctrine, state law
must be used to decide the issue. The Missouri Supreme Court has not
yet dealt with the issue. 0 This could change given the recent enactment of Missouri's certified question rule." This rule allows parties
litigating in federal court a state law question to which there is no
controlling precedent in Missouri to refer the question to the Missouri
Supreme Court for decision. 12 SUPERFUND litigants are likely to be
eager to certify the question of whether under Missouri law CGL policies
cover cleanup costs. Currently, however, only federal courts have dealt
with the issue.

such bodily injury or property damage, even if any of the

allegations of the suit are groundless, faultless or fraudulent ....
Kahn, LookingFor "Bodily Injury': What Triggers Coverage UnderA Standard
Comprehensive GeneralLiability InsurancePolicy?, 19 FORUM 532, 532 (1984).
For a history of the CGL, see American Home Prod. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 565
F. Supp. 1485, 1500-03 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
4. Hapke, Federal Circuit Court Insurance Decisions Contaminate
Superfund Policy, 19 ENvTL. L. REP. 10393, 10395 (1989).
5. Id.
6. See infra notes 212-17 and accompanying text.
7. See infra note 212 and accompanying text.
8. See infra note 217 and accompanying text.
9. Erie R.R v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
10. In fact the only Missouri decision to deal with this issue is an unreported Circuit Court Memorandum, Order and Partial Judgment of September 8,
1989 in Cooper Indus. v. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., No. 864-00284 (Cir. Ct.
of the City of St. Louis September 8, 1989).
11. Mo. REv. STAT. § 477.004 (Supp. 1989)
12. Mo. REv. STAT. § 477.004 (Supp. 1989). Since the writing of this Note
the issue in question has indeed been certified to the Missouri Supreme Court
by the Third Circuit. Jones Truck Lines v. Transport Ins. Co., No. 72650 (Mo.
July 13, 1990) (en banc). The court found, however, that it had no authority
under the Missouri Constitution to answer such questions. Id.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol55/iss2/5
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In Continental Insurance v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical and
Chemical Co. (NEPACCO),'3 the Eighth Circuit, applying Missouri law
and predicting how the Missouri Supreme Court would rule on this
issue, held that cleanup costs imposed under SUPERFUND are not
covered under a standard form CGL. More recently though in Jones
Truck Lines v. Transport Insurance Co. (Jones),14 the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, applying
Missouri law, held that such costs are covered under a CGL.
I. FACTS AND HOLDING
Jones Truck Lines (Jones) brought a declaratory judgment action
against its insurer, Transport Insurance Co. (Transport), in the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.' 5 Jones
asked the court to clarify the extent to which hazardous waste cleanup
costs incurred by Jones in order to avoid the initiation by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) of a SUPERFUND or Resource
Conservation and Recovery (RCRA) Act' action against Jones were
covered under a CGL issued to Jones by Transport.
Transport provided insurance to Jones under two CGL policies from
January 1, 1970 to January 1, '1973.18 These policies provided
coverage "for damages ...for loss of or damage to property of oth-

ers."19 During the coverage period Jones operated three trucking
During the coverage period Jones had a
terminals in Missouri.
contractor spray one of these terminals, the Hall Street facility, with oil

13. 842 F.2d 977 (8th Cir. 1988) (en banc).
14. Jones, No. 88-5723 (E.D. Pa. May 10, 1989) (WESTLAW, 1989 WL
49517).
15. Jones Memorandum, WESTLAW op. at 1.
16. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6991i (Supp. V 1987).
17. Jones Memorandum, WESTLAW op. at 1.
18. An Occupational Comprehensive Liability and Comprehensive Physical
Damage Policy which provided Jones with up to $15,000 of coverage and an

excess Occupational Comprehensive Liability and Comprehensive Physical
Damage Policy which provided Jones with up to $4,985,000 of coverage. Jones,
WESTLAW op. at 2. The policies provided:
(1) [For the insurer] [t]o pay on behalf of the insured all sums
which the insured shall become legally obligated to pay for damages,
arising out of the occupation of the named insured, as stated in the
declarations, as a result of personal injury, bodily injury, sickness,
disease or death to persons and for loss of or damage to property of
others.
Id- at 3-4.
19. Id.at 4 (emphasis added).
20. Jones, WESTLAW op. at 2.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1990
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to control dust on the unpaved roads around the facility." In 1982,
Jones learned that the Hall Street facility was on a list prepared by the
EPA of sites that might be contaminated with dioxin.' Samples of the
soil taken in 1983 confmned the presence of dioxin in the soil at the
Hall Street facility. 23
The EPA was ready and willing to take control and clean up the
site and bring an action against Jones under SUPERFUND or RCRA if
Jones did not clean up this site.' To avoid this, Jones hired a private
firm to do the cleanup and contamination control requested by the
EPA.' Jones claimed to have incurred $320,000 for the investigation
and cleanup of the Hall Street facility.2
Transport denied liability for the costs incurred in cleaning up the
Hall Street facility and sought summary judgment in the declaratory
judgment action.2 Transport alleged that the costs incurred by Jones
in connection with the Hall Street facility were not damages to property
as contemplated by the policiesY As a basis for its motion, Transport
relied on the Eighth Circuit's holding in NEPACCO that under Missouri
law "damages" in a CGL does not include cleanup costs.'
The district court was unable to discern any basis for the
NEPACCO decision under Missouri case law.30 The court found that
hazardous waste cleanup costs .re "damages" as the term is used in
comprehensive general liability insurance policies and denied Transport's motion for summary judgment."'

21. Id. at 3.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id at 24.
25. Id.
26. Id
27. Id. at 1.
28. Id. at 11 (emphasis added). Transport also sought summary judgment
on two additional grounds. First, Transport argued that the costs Jones
incurred in connection with the Hall Street facility were not covered by the
policies because they were costs incurred by Jones to clean up its own property
only. Id. Second, Transport argued that the costs that Jones incurred were not
covered by the policies since Jones was not legally obligated to pay for such costs
by any judgment or agreement. Id. The court denied Summary Judgment on
both of these grounds also. Id. at 26.
29. NEPACCO, 842 F.2d at 979.
30. Jones,WESTLAW op. at 20.
31. Id
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol55/iss2/5
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II. LEGAL BACKGROUND

A. The Road to NEPACCO
Many decisions have held that cleanup costs do not constitute
"damages" under a CGL.32 Some of these decisions were rendered
before the passage of SUPERFUND and involve cleanup of nontoxic
substances.3 They are important, though, because later courts dealing
with toxic waste-related-cleanups relied on their reasoning on whether
Two of the most important of
cleanup costs constitute "damages. 'l 4

these decisions are Desrochers v. New York Casualty Co.' and Aetna
Casualty and Surety Co. v. Hanna.' In Desrochers, the insured, the
Desrochers, regraded a marshy area on their land." In doing so they
obstructed a culvert bordering their property.3 As a result, their

32. Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Milliken & Co., 857 F.2d 979, 981 (4th Cir. 1988)
(South Carolina law); NEPACCO, 842 F.2d at 987; Maryland Cas. Co. v. Armco,
Inc., 822 F.2d 1348, 1354 (4th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1008 (1988)
(Maryland law); Mraz v. Canadian Universal Ins. Co., 804 F.2d 1325, 1329 (4th
Cir. 1986) (response costs are an economic loss under Maryland law); Aetna Cas.
& Sur. Co. v. Hanna, 224 F.2d 499, 503 (5th Cir. 1955) (Florida law); Aetna Cas.
v. Gulf Resources, 709 F. Supp. 958,961 (D. Idaho 1989) (court found arguments
that cleanup costs do not constitute "damages" persuasive, but denied coverage
for another reason under Idaho law); Maryland Cas. Co. v. Ormond, No. 873038, slip op. at 12 (W.D. Ark. Jan. 6, 1989) (Arkansas law); Ft. McHenry
Lumber Co. v. Pennsylvania Lumbermen's Mut. Ins. Co., No. HAR 88-825,
WESTLAW op. at 6 (D. Md. Sept. 23, 1988) (1989 WL 74843) (Maryland law);
Verlan, Ltd. v. John L. Armitage & Co., 695 F. Supp. 950, 955 (N.D. Ill. 1988),
reconsiderationdenied,No. 87-C-5121 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 27,1989) (WESTLAW, 1989
WL 8590) (Illinois law); Hayes v. Maryland Cas. Co., 688 F. Supp. 1513, 1515
(N.D. Fla. 1988) (Florida law); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Ross Elec., 685 F. Supp. 742,
745 (W.D. Wash. 1988) (Washington law); Garden Sanctuary, Inc. v. Insurance
Co. of N. Am., 292 So. 2d 75, 77 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974); Ladd Constr. Co. v.
Insurance Co. of N. Am., 391 N.E.2d 568, 570 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979); Desrochers v.
New York Cas. Co., 99 N.H. 129, 106 A.2d 196, 199 (1954).
33. Hanna, 224 F.2d 499 (removal of boulders and fill material); Garden
Sanctuary, 292 So. 2d 75 (restoration of burial grounds to its natural state);
Ladd, 391 N.E.2d 568 (removal of slag pile which collapsed on neighboring
railroad tracks); Desrochers,99 N.H. 129, 106 A.2d 196 (removal of obstruction
from drainage culvert).
34. NEPACCO, 842 F.2d at 985-86; Maryland Cas., 822 F.2d at 1352-53;
Verlan, 695 F. Supp. at 953-54; Ross, 685 F. Supp. at 745.
35. 99 N.H. 129, 106 A.2d 196 (1954).
36. 224 F.2d 499 (5th Cir. 1955).
37. Desrochers, 99 N.H. at 130, 106 A.2d at 197.
38. Id.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1990
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neighbor's land was flooded. 3 9 The neighbor filed a bill of equity
against the Desrochers asking the court to order the Desrochers to
remove the obstruction. 40 The court awarded damages to the neighbors
and ordered the Desrochers to remove the obstruction. 4 ' The Desrochers' insurer paid the damages but denied liability for the cost of
42
removing the obstruction.
The Desrochers brought a declaratory judgment action against their
insurer asking the court to determine the extent to which they were
covered under their CGL policy.48 On appeal, the Supreme Court of
New Hampshire determined that the insurance agreement did not
provide coverage for the costs the insured would incur in complying with
the injunction."
The court reasoned that if the Desrochers were to arrange for
others to do work necessary for compliance with the injunction, the costs
would be sums which the insured would be legally obligated to pay but
would not be sums which they were obligated to pay "as damages." 45
4
"Damages," wrote the court, "are recompense for injuries sustained."
"They are remedial rather than preventative in nature."' 47 The expense
of restoring the Desrochers' property would not remedy injury to any
third party.48 It would only prevent future harm.49 The court held

39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 130, 106 A.2d at 196.
44. Id. at 131, 106 A.2d at 198.
45. Id.The court wrote that the insured's legal obligation to pay would arise
from a contract with the repairer and that liability assumed under contract was
expressly excluded from coverage under the policy. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 132, 106 A.2d at 198.
49. Id. at 132-33, 106 A.2d at 198-99. The court reasoned that the insurer
was not liable to indemnify the Desrochers for this future harm because the
Desrochers would not become legally obligated to pay for the harm until another
flood occurred. Since the Desrochers's coverage had already terminated, no
liability could possibly arise during the coverage period. Id. Missouri courts
would be unlikely to rule the same way under similar circumstances. Both the
majority and the dissent in NEPACCO agreed that Missouri "would probably
adopt the 'exposure' theory of coverage." NEPACCO, 842 F.2d at 984. Under
the exposure theory of coverage an injury occurs when "one is first exposed to
that which eventually causes the injury." Hadzi-Antich, Coueragefor Environmental Liabilities Under the Comprehensive GeneralLiability InsurancePolicy;
How to Walk a Bull through a China Shop, 17 CoNN. L. Rav. 769, 782 (1985).
Arguably the blocking of the culvert could be viewed as the first exposure to
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol55/iss2/5

6

Burns: Burns:
Are Costs to COSTS
Clean Up
CLEANUP
TOXIC WASTE

1990]

the term "damages," does not include the cost of compliance with a
mandatory injunction. 50

In Aetna Casualty and Surety Co. v. Hanna, the Fifth Circuit

expanded the Desrochers holding.5 1 In Hanna, the insured filled in a
once submerged lot with boulders, trash, and dirt.5 2 Storms and high
water undermined the retaining wall separating the Hannas' lot from
their neighbor's lot.0 The fill was deposited on the neighbor's lot.6
The neighbor brought an action against the Hannas to have them
remove the boulders and fill. The action also sought to restrain further
trespass by requiring the Hannas to build a retaining wall.55
The Hannas's insurer refused to defend or to indemnify the
The Hannas brought suit against the insurer seeking
Hannas.
damages for the insurer's failure to indemnify.57 On appeal, the Fifth
that the insured had no duty to indemnify the
Circuit concluded
58
Hannas.
Under the policy, the court wrote, the insurer only had an obligation to pay, not to remove boulders and dirt. 59 The court interpreted
the policy as only requiring payment if the third party had a legal claim
"Damages," the court maintained, "has an accepted
for "damages."'
technical meaning in law."' "Damages," wrote the court, are "pecunicourts by
ary compensation or indemnity which may be recovered in the
62
"This,"
any person who has suffered loss, detriment or injury."
cost to unsuccessful
concluded the Fifth Circuit, "is a far cry from the
'
litigants of complying with an injunctive decree. 63

which the later injury would relate back.
50. Desrochers,99 N.H. at 132-33, 106 A.2d at 199.
51. Hanna,224 F.2d 499 (5th Cir. 1955).
52. Id at 500.
53. Id

54. Id
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Id at 501.
Id
Id-at 502.
Id. at 504.
Id. at 503 (emphasis added).
Id. at 503.
Id

62. Id. (quoting BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 499 (3d ed. 1933)).

63. Hanna, 224 F.2d at 503. The court also argued that damages in an
action for trespass equals the difference in value of the land before and after the
trespass, not the cost of removing the rocks. Id. The addition of rocks,
hypothesized the court, in some situations might have increased the value of the
land. Id. Missouri, however, has accepted a definition of damages which
measures damages as the cost of restoring the land to its original condition.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1990
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The first SUPERFUND case to hold that cleanup costs do not
constitute damages under a CGL was Maryland Casualty Co. v. Arnco,
Inc.' In Armco, the insured, an original waste generator, stored its
waste at a storage site which followed improper storage techniques
which resulted in seepage of toxic chemicals into the soil and groundwater surrounding the site.'
The federal government brought suit
against the owners of the waste storage facility and the original waste
generators including the insured under SUPERFUND and RCRA.'
The government sought the defendant's compliance with a comprehensive remedial action program to prevent further seepage and to
reimburse the government for its response costs."7
The insured brought a declaratory judgment action against its
insurer to determine the extent to which it was covered under its
CGL.' On appeal, the Fourth Circuit held that the insured was not
covered for the costs of complying with the SUPERFUND order. 9 The
court held that a "claim seeking compliance with the regulatory
directives of a federal agency, which compliance takes the form of
obedience to injunctions and reimbursement of remedial costs, does not
constitute a claim for 'damages' under the insurance policy."7 The
court stated that previous judicial decisions had given a limited
definition to the term "damages."71 The term "damages," the court
wrote, denotes "only payments to third persons when those persons have
a legal claim for damages." 72 Reimbursement of cleanup costs
pursuant to SUPERFUND is not "damages" in this legal sense."3 It is
a form of equitable remedial relief.74
These three cases delineate the major arguments in favor of not
regarding cleanup costs as "damages." Desrochersand Hanna stand for
the proposition that actions for equitable injunctive relief are not actions

Jack L. Baker Cos. v. Pasley Mfg. & Distrib. Co., 413 S.W.2d 268, 273 (Mo.
1967) ("where damaged property can be restored to its former condition at a cost
less than the diminution in value, the cost of restoration is the proper recovery").
64. 822 F.2d 1348 (4th Cir. 1987).
65. Id at 1350.
66. Id; United States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 653 F. Supp. 152 (W.D.
Mo. 1986).
67. Armco, 822 F.2d at 1350-51.
68. Id. at 1351; Maryland Cas. Co. v. Armco, Inc., 643 F. Supp. 430 (D. Md.
1986).
69. Armco, 822 F.2d at 1354.
70. Id. at 1350.
71. Id at 1352.
72. Id (quoting Hanna,224 F.2d at 503).
73. Armco, 822 F.2d at 1352.
74. Id.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol55/iss2/5
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for "damages."' 5 Armco stands for the proposition that actions for the
equitable relief of restitution or reimbursement are not actions for
"damages.0 6 The rule in Desrochers and Hanna precludes the insurer
from being liable when the insured is ordered to clean up a site. The
rule in Armco precludes an insurer from being liable when the insured
is asked to reimburse a government agency for cleaning up a site. Many
other cases have relied on the reasoning of these three cases or similar
reasoning
in holding that cleanup costs do not constitute damages under
77
a CGL.
B. Aviex and its Progeny
United States Aviex Co. v. Travelers Insurance Co.," was the first
of a line of cases rejecting the equitable/legal distinction developed in
Desrochers and Hanna.9 In Aviex, a fire destroyed Aviex's chemical
manufacturing facility.' ° Water used in extinguishing the fire caused
toxic chemicals to seep into the ground contaminating the groundwater
beneath Aviex's property."' The Michigan Department of Natural
Resources ordered Aviex to have performed a study to determine the
extent of the contamination and to correct the contamination.82 Aviex's
insurer denied coverage under the CGL policy for both the costs
incurred in performing the study and the costs to cleanup the contamination.8 3 Aviex brought a declaratory judgment action asking the
court to clarify the obligation of its insurer to pay the costs.' The trial
court held that the insurer was liable to pay the costs and the Michigan
Court of Appeals affirmed.85
The court of appeals found that Aetna and Desrochershad interpreted "damages" too narrowly.8 Since the Attorney General of Michigan
could have filed suit to recover full value for injuries done to natural

75. See supra text accompanying notes 37-63.
76. See supra text accompanying note 70.
77. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
78. 125 Mich. App. 579, 336 N.W.2d 838 (Mich. App. 1983).
79. Hapke, supra note 4, at 10396.
80. Aviex, 125 Mich. App. at 583, 336 N.W.2d at 840.
81. Id82. Id The insured was notified that it "must conduct an investigation to
determine the extent of the contamination and correct the contamination or the
DNR [Michigan's Department of Natural Resources] would refer the matter for
legal action." Id
83. Id
84. Id85. Id at 584-85, 590, 336 N.W.2d at 841, 843.
86. Id. at 589, 336 N.W.2d at 843.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1990
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resources of the state8 7 in which case the insurer's liability would have
been clear, the court wrote that it was "merely fortuitous" that the
Attorney General had decided not to do so but instead decided to order
the insured to remedy the problem.88 The damage to the natural
resources, the cost to
restore the water to its original condition, is the
89
same in either case.
Aviex is important for two reasons. First, implicit in the Aviex
decision is the idea that if the government cleans up a toxic waste site
and sues the insured for the costs it incurs in doing so, payments made
by the insured are "damages." The court in Aviex assumed rather than
decided this. A number of courts have held rather than assumed that
this is so.90
Second, the court in Aviex held that the costs incurred by the
insured in complying with a government order for the insured to clean
up the substances are "damages."9' Aviex based this holding on the
similarity between such liability and the liability imposed upon an
insured when the government cleans up the property and has the
insured reimburse the 93
costs.92 A number of other courts have also
conclusion.
reached this

87. 1& at 589-90, 336 N.W.2d at 843.
88. Id at 590, 336 N.W.2d at 843.
89. Id This measure of damages was rejected by the courts in Armco,
Hanna, and Desrochers. Armco, 822 F.2d at 1353; Hanna, 224 F.2d at 503;
Desrochers,99 N.H. at 132-33, 106 A.2d at 199.
90. National Indem. Co. v. U.S. Pollution Control, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 765,
767 (W.D. Okl. 1989); Chesapeake Utils. Corp. v. American Home Assurance Co.,
704 F. Supp. 551, 565 (D. Del. 1989); U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Thomas
Solvent Co., 683 F. Supp. 1139, 1168 (W.D. Mich. 1988); Fireman's Fund Ins.
Cos. v. Ex-Cell-O Corp., 662 F. Supp. 71, 75 (E.D. Mich. 1987); CPS Chem. Co.
v. Continental Ins. Co., 222 N.J. Super. 175, ---, 536 A.2d 311,314 (Ct. App. Div.

1988).
91. Aviex, 125 Mich. App. at 587-90, 336 N.W.2d at 842-43.
92. Id. at 589-90, 336 N.W.2d at 843.
93. Avondale Ind., Inc. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 887 F.2d 1200 (2d Cir.
1989); Port of Portland v. Water Quality Ins. Syndicate, 796 F.2d 1188, 1194
(9th Cir. 1986) (cleanup costs are recoverable under a property damage liability
clause); Chesapeake Utils. Corp. v. American Home Assurance Co., 704 F. Supp.
551, 561 (D. Del. 1989); Intel Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 692 F.
Supp. 1171, 1192 (N.D. Cal. 1988); Centennial Ins. Co. v. Lumbermens Mut.
Cas. Co., 677 F. Supp. 342, 350 (E.D. Pa. 1987); New Castle County v. Hartford
Accident & Indem. Co., 673 F. Supp. 1359, 1365-66 (D. Del. 1987); Township of
Gloucester v. Maryland Cas. Co., 668 F. Supp. 394, 400 (D. NJ. 1987);
Fireman's Fund Ins. Cos. v. Ex-Cell-O Corp., 662 F. Supp. 71, 75 (E.D. Mich.
1987); Upjohn Co. v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 178 Mich. App. 706, 720, 444
N.W.2d 813,819 (1989); Broadwell Realty Servs. v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 218 N.J.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol55/iss2/5
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Representative of the cases holding that "damages" includes the
cost of reimbursing the government for cleanup costs the government
incurs in cleaning up a site is U.S. Fidelityand GuarantyCo. v. Thomas
Solvent Co.'
In this case, Thomas Solvent Company, the insured,
contaminated the groundwater beneath the land it occupied with
industrial solvents which it produced.9 5 The groundwater flow caused
residential wells located nearby to become contaminated and also
carried the contamination to a nearby city.' The United States, acting
under the authority of SUPERFUND, sought reimbursement of costs
97
incurred in responding to the release of these hazardous substances.
Thomas Solvent Company's insurer refused to defend it in the action.'
The insurer argued that claims by the EPA for remedial and response
costs are not claims for "damages" under a CGL.9
The judge deciding the case was not convinced by the insurer's
arguments. The judge especially took issue with the insurer relying on°
the historical distinction between law and equity to deny coverage.'0
The judge wrote that "the insured ought to be able to rely on the
common sense expectation that property damage within the meaning of
the policy includes a claim which results in causing him to pay sums of
money because his acts or omissions affected adversely the rights of

Super 516, ---, 528 A.2d 76, 82 (Ct. App. Div. 1987); cf. Chemical Applications
Co. v. Home Indem. Co., 425 F. Supp. 777, 779 (D. Mass. 1977) (insured was
covered under CGL where insured performed removal and cleanup work itself
instead of permitting government to have it done by others and bring suit);
Lansco, Inc. v. Department of Envtl. Protection, 138 N.J. Super. 275, 284, 350
A.2d 520, 525 (Ct. Ch. Div. 1975) (determines that cleanup costs are a measure
of damages while deciding that an injury to the environment constitutes
property damage under a CGL); Kutsher's Country Club Corp. v. Lincoln Ins.,
119 Misc. 2d 889,893,465 N.Y.S.2d 136, 189 (Sup. Ct. 1983) ("imposing the cost
of cleanup by statute ... is clearly reflective of the state's power to establish
damages"); Lehigh Elec. & Eng'g Co. v. Selected Risks Ins. Co., 30 Pa. D. & C.3d
120, 122 (1982) (sums expended in an effort to clear up a spillage in order to
prevent and mitigate the occurrence of damage to property of others is covered
under a CGL); Aronson Assocs., Inc. v. Pennsylvania Nat'l Mut. Cas. Ins. Co.,
14 Pa. D & C.3d 1, 7 (1977) (preventative measures such as cleanup costs can
be recovered where they are required to protect against a third person's property
being harmed).
94. 683 F. Supp. 1139 (W.D. Mich. 1988).
95. Id- at 1145.
96. Id
97. Id- at 1168.
98. Id
99. Id.
100. Id.
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third parties.'' 11 The judge noted that claims for reimbursement of
response costs might be characterized as claims seeking "equitable
relief," but in fact such costs are essentially compensatory damages for
injury to property. °2 The common sense expectation and contractual
understanding of the insured, not the artificial and highly technical
legal definition of "damages" ought to control. 1 3
Representative of the cases holding that "damages" includes costs
incurred by the insured in complying with a government order to clean
up the site is CentennialInsuranceCo. v. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty
Co."°M In this case, Jordan Chemical Company (Jordan) hired a
disposal service which improperly disposed of Jordan's waste. 10 5 The
United States government brought an action against Jordan under
SUPERFUND alleging that Jordan had endangered health and
environment at the disposal site by improperly depositing the
waste. "° Jordan presented claims to defend and indemnify to its two
insurers.0 " One insurer, Lumbermens, disclaimed coverage."~ The
other insurer, Centennial, defended Jordan in the action and settled the
claims. 0 9

Centennial and Jordan brought a declaratory judgment action
asking the court to declare that Lumbermens had been obligated to
0
defend and indemnify Jordan against the SUPERFUND claims."
Lumbermens contended that its policy did not provide coverage for the
SUPERFUND claims because they sought equitable relief rather than
legal damages."' The court disagreed.1 2 As did the Aviex court,
the court in Centennial noted that in SUPERFUND actions the
government may either seek an injunction ordering the polluter to clean
up the site or clean up the site itself and sue the polluter for response
costs."

3

"When such an option exists," wrote the court, "coverage

should not hinge on the form of action taken or the nature of the relief
sought.""n 4 "Coverage," wrote the court, "should be triggered when an

101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Id.
Id
Id.
677 F. Supp. 342 (E.D. Pa. 1987).
Id at 343-44.
Id- at 344.
Id- at 344-45.
Id at 344.
Id at 344-45.
Id at 345.
Id. at 349.
Id. at 350.
Id. at 349-50.
Id at 350.
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actual or threatened use of the legal process coerces payment or clean
up conduct by a policyholder.""15 Under this definition costs to clean
up waste are damages under a CGL. 1 6
Recently, the Second Circuit also held that costs incurred by an
insured in cleaning up a site are "damages" under a CGL. In Avondale
Industries, Inc. v. Travelers Indemnity Co.," 7 the insured Avondale
Industries, Inc. sought a judgment declaring that its insurer was
obligated to defend it in proceedings to be taken against Avondale by
the Louisiana State Department of Environmental Quality. In these
proceedings, the Department of Environmental Quality sought to have
Avondale clean up a disposal site where Avondale had deposited
hazardous substances. 18 Avondale had been insured by its insurer
under a CGL at the time the substances had been deposited.119
Here also, the insurer argued that "damages" only includes
remedies at law.'" The court disagreed. The court noted that the
term "damages" was not defined in the CGL.' 2' The court wrote that
without a specific exclusionary definition of "damages" in the policy to
alert him, an ordinary businessman reading the policy would have
believed himself covered for potential claims for cleanup costs.' 22
Since it was not given a limiting definition
in the policy, the term must
123
be construed to embrace coverage.
C. A Missouri View
In Cooper Industries,Inc. v. American Mutual Liability Insurance
Co., a recently decided Missouri circuit court case, a middle-ground
approach was taken.124 The court held that an action by the government seeking reimbursement of response costs was a claim for "damages," but an action seeking an order for an insured to clean up a
hazardous waste site at the insured's expense was not an action for
"damages." The court noted that the plain everyday meaning of
"damages" was "compensation for loss or injury."'" An action seeking

115. Id
116. Id
117. 887 F.2d 1200 (2d. Cir. 1989).
118. Id. at 1202.
119. Id
120. Id at 1207.
121. Id
122. Id
123. Id
124. Cooper Indus. v. American Mut. Liab. Ins., No. 864-00284, slip op. at
36 (Cir. Ct. of the City of St. Louis Sept. 8, 1989).
125. Cooper, slip op. at 37.
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reimbursement of response costs does indeed seek compensation for loss
or injury." But, an action for an injunction to have the insured clean
up a site seeks enforcement not compensation.12
D. NEPACCO-An Eighth CircuitPrediction of Missouri Law
The first case in which Missouri law was used to decide the issue
of whether cleanup costs are "damages" under a CGL was NEPACCO.
In NEPACCO, Northeastern Pharmaceutical and Chemical Company
(NEPACCO) was insured by Continental Insurance from August 1970
to November, 1972 under three standard-form CGLs. 128 Continental
agreed "to pay on behalf of [NEPACCO] all sums which [NEPACCO
became] legally obligated to pay as damages because of... property
12 9
damage."'
"NEPACCO improperly disposed of and hired contractors who
improperly disposed of waste containing dioxin. 3 The EPA cleaned
up the sites contaminated by this waste and sought to recover its costs
pursuant to SUPERFUND in a lawsuit against NEPACCO.' 3 ' Also
the State of Missouri sued NEPACCO for costs incurred by the state in
excavating and removing dioxin contaminated soil from one of the
32
sites.
Continental filed a declaratory judgment action against NEPACCO
to determine its liability in connection with the EPA and State of
Missouri suits.'33 On appeal, a panel of the Eighth Circuit held that
cleanup costs imposed in accordance with SUPERFUND are "damages"
under a CGL policy." The Eighth Circuit en banc reversed."
The court wrote that these lawsuits in which the government was
seeking recovery of cleanup costs under SUPERFUND were essentially
equitable actions for restitution or reimbursement of costs."
The
government was not seeking "damages.' 37

126. Id.
127. Id.
128. NEPACCO, 842 F.2d at 979.
129. Id
130. Id
131. Id. at 980.
132. Id at 981.
133. Id.
134. Continental Ins. Cos. v. Northeastern Pharm. & Chem. Co., 811 F.2d
1180, 1189 (8th Cir. 1987).
135. NEPACCO, 842 F.2d at 987.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 985-86.
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The court cited applicable Missouri rules of contract interpretation
which held that
[t]he rules of construction applicable to insurance contracts require
that the language used be given its plain meaning. If the language is
unambiguous the policy must be enforced according to such language.
If the language is ambiguous it will be construed against the insurer.
Language is ambiguous if it is reasonably open to different constructions; and language used will be viewed in light of "the meaning that
would ordinarily be understood by the lay[person] who bought and
paid for the policy."1"8
The court wrote that case law was sharply divided on whether
"damages" covers cleanup costs and that outside the insurance context
the term "damages" is ambiguous. "1 "IFirom the viewpoint of the lay
insured," the court wrote, "the term 'damages' could reasonably include
all monetary claims, whether such claims are described as damages,
expenses, costs, or losses.' 40 But in the insurance context, the term
"damages" is not ambiguous. In the insurance context "damages" refer
to legal damages, not claims for equitable monetary relief.'
E.

NEPACCO'S Dissent

A strong dissent took issue with the court's reasoning. The dissent
wrote that the majority disregarded established Missouri law. 142 The
dissent noted that the Supreme Court of Missouri sitting en banc had
held that rules of construction in insurance contracts provide that if
ambiguous language is used in an insurance contract, it "will be viewed
in light of 'the meaning that would ordinarily be understood by the
layman who bought and paid for the policy."' 43 According to the
dissent, the majority ignored this lay definition and substituted a
technical insurance definition of "damages" without citing a single
Missouri case which justified substitution.'"
The dissent quoted the majority as writing "[f]rom the viewpoint of
the lay insured, the term 'damages' could reasonably include all

138.
695, 698
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
695, 698
144.

Id. at 985 (quoting Robin v. Blue Cross Hosp. Serv., Inc., 637 S.W.2d
(Mo. 1982) (en banc) (citations omitted)).
NEPACCO, 842 F.2d at 985.
Id
Id.
NEPACCO, 842 F.2d at 987 (Heaney, J. dissenting).
Id. at 988 (quoting Robin v. Blue Cross Hosp. Serv., Inc., 637 S.W.2d
(Mo. 1982) (en banc) (citations omitted)).
NEPACCO, 842 F.2d at 988 (Heaney, J. dissenting).
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monetary claims, whether such claims are described as damages,
expenses, costs, or losses."'145 This concession, wrote the dissent,
should have been dispositive in light of the Missouri Supreme Courts
holding in Robin v. Blue Cross Hospital Service, Inc.14

According to

this case, when a word is open to different constructions, the word must
be accorded the meaning ordinarily
given it by the lay person who
147
bought and paid for the policy.
The dissent also argued that the technical meaning given to the
term "damages" by the majority would not include the cost of restoring
real property to the pre-damage condition."¢ This is contrary to the
legal definition of "damages" developed in Missouri case law which
includes the cost of restoring real property to its pre-damaged condition.'49 According to the dissent, prior Missouri case law on the
definition of "damages" and prior Missouri case law on insurance
contract construction demands that cleanup costs be considered
"damages."
III. THE INSTANT DECISION
The court in Jones began its analysis of the "damages" issue by
acknowledging that the Eighth Circuit had held the term "damages" in
a CGL does not include cleanup cost." The court said it would defer
to the Eighth Circuit's view of Missouri law unless it found that the
Eighth Circuit "ignored clear signals emanating from the state court" or
"clearly misread state law."'151 After reviewing Missouri law on
insurance contract interpretation, the district court
decided that the
1 52
Eighth Circuit had clearly misread Missouri law.
The court noted that the majority's conclusion in NEPACCO was
not based on Missouri case law or Missouri rules of insurance contract

145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. The dissent also points out that the majority's reliance on Armco
was misplaced. Id at 989. Armco was decided under Maryland law noted the
dissent. Id The dissent argued that Maryland law and Missouri law differ as
to the meaning to be given "damages." Id at 989-90. Under Maryland law,
wrote the dissent, "damages" must be construed according to its narrow,
technical meaning. Id. at 989. But under Missouri law, argued the dissent,
damages must be accorded "the meaning that lay persons would give it." Id. at
990.
148. Id.
149. Id
150. Jones, WESTLAW op. at 12.
151. Id. at 13.
152. Id. at 20.
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607

construction."
Rather, the court said, in adopting a technical,
insurance industry definition of the term, the majority cited a Fourth
Circuit case applying Maryland rather than Missouri substantive
law.'6
As both the majority and dissent did in NEPACCO, the court
quoted Robin v. Blue Cross Hospital Service, Inc. and Green v. Zurich
InsuranceCo., and concluded that in Missouri "damages" must be given
the meaning that would ordinarily be understood by the layperson who
bought and paid for the policy.5 'the court stated that "from the
viewpoint of the 'lay insured,' the term 'damages' could reasonably
include all monetary claims, whether such claims are described as
Consequently the court wrote,
damages, expenses, costs, or losses."'1
according to Missouri law "damages,"-as the term is used in comprehensive7 general liability insurance policies-must include cleanup
15
costs.

IV. ANALYSIS
A. Introduction
In Jones Truck Lines v. TransportInsurance Co., the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania determined that
the Eighth Circuit in deciding NEPACCO had clearly misread Missouri
law. 5 The district court held that the term "damages" in a liability
insurance policy encompasses environmental cleanup costs imposed on
an insured by a state or federal agency.' m The district court was
correct in its analysis of Missouri law and its rejection of the definition
of "damages" posited by the Eighth Circuit."6 Under Missouri law the
term "damages" in a liability insurance policy must be construed to
include environmental cleanup costs.' 6'
But the district court's analysis was incomplete. The district court
in deciding Jones failed to discuss the facts of the case before it and how
the determination that "damages" include cleanup costs like those
imposed in NEPACCO was relevant in deciding the case.' 62 The

153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

Id at 20.
Id
Id- at 19.
I&
Id- at 20.

158. I&
159. Id.
160. See infra text accompanying notes 170-86.
161. See infratext accompanying notes 170-86.
162. See infra text accompanying notes 187-90.
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situation in NEPACCO is on the surface different from that in Jones.
In NEPACCO the EPA sought to have the insured reimburse it for
cleanup costs." In Jones the EPA in essence ordered the insured to
cleanup hazardous waste.'6
One action sought reimbursement of
cleanup costs; the other sought to have the insured clean up contamination. Some courts have considered these two remedies as being different
from one another and accordingly have treated them differently in
analyzing the construction of the term "damages.""l

Indeed, the two actions should be treated similarly.'6
Liability
imposed by an action to have an insured clean up a hazardous waste
site as well as liability imposed by an action to have an insured

163. NEPACCO, 842 F.2d at 980.
164. Jones, WESTLAW op. at 24.
165. See Cooper Indus., Inc. v. American Mut. Liability Ins. Co., No. 86400284 (Cir. Ct. of St. Louis Sept. 8, 1989). But see, Avondale Indus., Inc. v.
Travelers Indem. Co., 887 F.2d 1200, 1226-27 (2d Cir. 1989); Port of Portland v.
Water Quality Ins. Syndicate, 796 F.2d 1188,1194 (9th Cir. 1986) (cleanup costs
are recoverable under a property damage liability clause); Chesapeake Utils.
Corp. v. American Home Assurance Co., 704 F. Supp. 551, 561 (D. Del. 1989);
Intel Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 692 F. Supp. 1171, 1192 (N.D.
Cal. 1988); Centennial Ins. Co. v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 677 F. Supp. 342,
350 (E.D. Pa. 1987); New Castle County v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 673
F. Supp. 1359, 1365-66 (D. Del. 1987); Township of Gloucester v. Maryland Cas.
Co., 668 F. Supp. 394,400 (D.N.J. 1987); Fireman's Fund Ins. Cos. v. Ex-Cell-O
Corp., 662 F. Supp. 71,75 (E.D. Mich. 1987); Upjohn Co. v. New Hampshire Ins.
Co., 178 Mich. App. 706, 719-20,444 N.W.2d 813,819 (1989); Broadwell Realty
Servs. v. Fidelity & Cas. Co. of New York, 218 N.J. Super. 516, 528 A.2d 76, 82
(Ct. App. Div. 1987). Cf Chemical Applications Co. v. Home Indem. Co., 425 F.
Supp. 777, 779 (D. Mass. 1977) (insured was covered under CGL where insured
performed removal and cleanup work itself instead of permitting government to
have it done by others and bring suit); Aviex, 125 Mich. App. 579, 589-90, 336
N.W.2d 838, 843 (1983); Lansco, Inc. v. Department of Envtl. Protection, 138
N.J. Super. 275, 283-84, 350 A.2d 520, 525 (Ct. Ch. Div. 1975) (determines that
cleanup costs are a measure of damages while deciding that an injury to the
environment constitutes property damage under a CGL), affd, 145 N.J. Super.
433, 368 A.2d 363 (Ct. App. Div. 1976), cert. denied, 73 N.J. 57, 372 A.2d 322
(1977); Kutsher's Country Club Corp. v. Lincoln Ins. Co., 465 N.Y.S.2d 136, 139,
119 Misc. 2d 889, 893 (Sup. Ct. 1983) ("imposing the cost of cleanup by
statute... is clearly reflective of the State's power to establish damages");
Lehigh Elec. & Eng'g Co. v. Selected Risks Ins. Co., 30 Pa. D & C.3d 120, 122
(1982) (sums expended in an effort to clear up a spillage in order to prevent and
mitigate the occurrence of damage to property of others is covered under a CGL);
Aronson Assocs., Inc. v. Pennsylvania Nat'l Mut. Cas. Ins. Co., 14 Pa. D & C.3d
1, 7 (1977) (preventative measures such as cleanup costs can be recovered where
they are required to protect against a third person's property being harmed).
166. See infratext accompanying notes 196-217.
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reimburse the costs the government incurred in cleaning up the site
167
should be considered "damages" in a liability insurance policy.
Further analysis, though, is required to arrive at this conclusion. 68
The court in Jonesbrushed over the distinction, failing to show how the
two remedies are different yet should be treated similarly.
B. Missouri Law: Cleanup Costs are Damages
The court in Jones correctly interpreted Missouri rules of construction to hold that cleanup costs are damages under a CGL. 169 Missouri
courts have provided that insurance policy terms should be given "the
meaning which the ordinary insured of average intelligence and common
understanding reasonably would give to the words or language under
consideration."'70 Missouri courts have also held that if the policy
171
language is ambiguous it will be construed against the insurer.
Finally, Missouri courts have held that "an insurance contract reasonably susceptible of any interpretation favorable to the insured will be so
construed in order to avoid a forfeiture.' 172 Taking these rules of
construction into consideration it becomes clear that the court in Jones
correctly rejected the narrow 73definition of "damages" posited by the
Eighth Circuit in NEPACCO.
The court in NEPACCO conceded that lay policyholders would most
likely interpret "damages" to include "any compensatory obligation
imposed upon them."'1 4 The Eighth Circuit also conceded that this
"layperson" definition fails to distinguish legal damages from equitable
damages. 7 5 Nevertheless, the Eighth Circuit relied on this distinction
between legal and equitable damages to exclude costs of equitable
relief. 71 In doing so the Eighth Circuit failed to follow the established

167. See infra text accompanying notes 196-217.
168. See infra text accompanying notes 187-217.
169. See infra text accompanying notes 170-86.
170. Hammontree v. Central Mut. Ins. Co., 385 S.W.2d 661, 666-67 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1965).
171. Robin v. Blue Cross Hosp. Servs., 637 S.W.2d 695, 698 (Mo. 1982) (en
banc) (citing Meyer Jewelry Co. v. General Ins. Co. of America, 422 S.W.2d 617,
623 (Mo. 1968)).
172. Bellamy v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., 651 S.W.2d 490, 495-96 (1983)
(citation omitted).
173. See infra text accompanying notes 174-87.
174. Note, Does the Term "Damages" in the Comprehensive General
InsurancePolicy Include EnvironmentalCleanup Costs?, 22 CREIGHTON L. REV.
1035, 1050 (1988-89).
175. Id.
176. NEPACCO, 842 F.2d at 985.
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Missouri rules of insurance contract construction. The Eighth Circuit's
definition of "damages" is not the layperson's definition of damages
which the Missouri rules of construction demand.
"Damages" can really only be seen as distinguishing between legal
and equitable relief "by a lawyer, steeped in the traditional distinction
between law and equity and schooled by the federal courts to be wary
of the liberality of jury trials." 77 In Missouri, though, it is not the
lawyer's or insurance specialist's definition which is controlling but that
of the ordinary layman. 7
As the dissent wrote in NEPACCO, "[I]f
the insurer wished to use a technical, legal meaning for that term which
differed from the accepted dictionary definition, it should have explicitly
done so."'171 Under Missouri law if damages is open to different
constructions it must be accorded the meaning 1ordinarily given it by the
layperson who bought and paid for the policy. 80
The Eighth Circuit in NEPACCO also rejected another Missouri
definition of "damages" under which cleanup costs would be considered
"damages." In Jack L. Baker Cos. v. PasleyManufacturing& Distributing Co., an action for "damages," the court wrote that "where damaged
property can be restored to its former condition at a cost less than the
diminution in value, the cost of restoration is the proper recovery."'
The interpretation of "damages" as the cost of restoration of property
does not restrict "damages" to its narrow technical meaning. 182
Rather it suggests that actions for cleanup costs and actions to force an
insured to clean up hazardous waste, which are measures designed to
restore property to its previous condition, are also actions for "damages"

in Missouri.8
The court in NEPACCO had before it two definitions of damages
which were favorable to the insured-the layperson definition and the
Baker definition."3
Given Missouri's rule of construction that "an
insurance contract reasonably susceptible of any interpretation
favorable to the insured will be so construed in order to avoid a

177. Cooper Indus., slip op. at 33.
178. Hammontree at 666-67. Missouri "courts do not necessarily accept the
construction accorded to policy terms by astute insurance specialists or
perspicacious counsel but rather are concerned with the meaning which the
ordinary insured of average intelligence and common understanding would give
the words or language under consideration." Id.
179. NEPACCO, 842 F.2d at 988 (Heaney dissenting).
180. Robin, 637 S.W.2d at 698.
181. Baker, 413 S.W.2d at 273.
182. Note, supra note 174, at 1051.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 1051-52.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol55/iss2/5

20

1990]

Burns: Burns: Are Costs to Clean Up

TOXTC WASTE CLEANUP COSTS

forfeiture,"'5 the Eighth Circuit should have chosen one of these
definitions and construed "damages" to include cleanup costs."s The
court in Jones in rejecting the NEPACCO definition of "damages"
defined "damages" as a Missouri court would define "damages."
C. Cost to Clean up and Cleanup Costs Distinguished
In focusing on the misconstruction of the term "damages" in
NEPACCO however, the district court failed to consider that the
underlying actions taken by the EPA against the insured in NEPACCO
were different from the underlying action taken by the EPA against the
insured in Jones.
The court in Jones correctly determined that under Missouri law
liability imposed as a result of an action such as that in NEPACCO for
response costs should be considered "damages."'1 7 The court did not
show why liability imposed by an order for the insured to clean up the
site should be considered "damages."1 8 Indeed such liability should
189
To
constitute "damages" under a liability insurance policy.
understand this though, it is necessary to clarify the differences between
the various types of remedies which have been imposed on the insured
in cases dealing with the construction of the term "damages" in a
CGL.'" There are three types of actions which have been discussed
in these cases.
Action One-The "common law action." After toxic waste has
harmed the property of a third party that party may bring an action
against the insured to have the insured compensate them for that harm.
This is the common law action for "damages" which both camps, the
insureds and the insurers, agree is covered under a CGL.
Action Two-The "response costs action." After the release of the
hazardous substance, the EPA or a state may clean up the site in
accordance with SUPERFUND and later bring an action against the
insured for the expenses (response costs) it incurred in cleaning up the
site. This was the type of action on which the insured based its claim
against the insurer in NEPACCO. This was characterized by the
majority in NEPACCO as an equitable action for restoration or

185. Bellamy v. Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co., 651 S.W.2d 490, 495-96 (Mo.
1983) (citation omitted).
186. Note, supranote 174 at 1052.
187. See supra text accompanying notes 169-86.
188. See infra text accompanying notes 190-95.
189. See infra text accompanying notes 196-217.
190. See infra text accompanying notes 191-95.
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restitution and thus not covered under a policy providing coverage for
19 1
"damages."

Action Three-The "clean up action." After the release of the
hazardous substance, the EPA or the state may order or bring an action
to have the insured clean up the site. This was the type of action and
the remedy sought by the Michigan Department of Natural Resources
192
in Aviex.

The court in NEPACCO held that "damages" only included the
remedy sought in the "common law action." 93 The thrust of the
opinion in Jones was that a legal obligation to pay "damages" under
Missouri law was inclusive of the remedies sought in both the "common
'1
law action" and the "response costs action."'
The remedy imposed upon Jones Truck Lines though is not the
remedy discussed in the "response costs action" but the remedy
discussed in the "clean up action." The EPA, in essence, did not bring
an action against Jones for cleanup costs after it cleaned up the Hall
Street facility. The EPA ordered Jones to clean up the Hall Street
facility. 11 The Jones court should have argued that an action for
"damages" was inclusive of the "clean up action" as well as the "response
costs action."
D.

Should "Damages"Include the Cost to Clean Up

Although the court in Jones did not do so, a strong argument can
be made that "damages" in a liability insurance policy should include
liability imposed by the "clean up action." 196
There are three reasons why "damages" as that term is used in
liability insurance policies should include the liability imposed by the
"clean up action." First, to so construe "damages" comports with case
law holding that the "clean up action" is equivalent to the "response
costs action." 197 Second, to so construe "damages" comports with the
reasonable expectation of the parties upon entering the insurance
agreement. 198 Finally, to so construe "damages" comports with the
policies behind SUPERFUND. 1'

191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.

See supratext accompanying note 136.
See supratext accompanying note 82.
See supratext accompanying note 141.
See supratext accompanying note 159.
See supra text accompanying note 24.
See infra text accompanying notes 197-217.
See infra text accompanying notes 200-03.
See infratext accompanying notes 204-11.
See infratext accompanying notes 212-17.
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613

1. Costs to Clean Up Are Equivalent to Cleanup Costs
In Aviex, the court assumed that a "response costs action" was an
action for "damages" under a CGL. ° The question before the court
was whether the Michigan Department of Natural Resources (DNR)
ordering Aviex to clean up (the "clean up action") was the same as the
DNR cleaning up itself and bringing an action for response costs against
Aviex (the response costs action)."° The court in Aviex answered
yes.m The court reasoned that when the state can either clean up
and sue for response costs or order the insured to cleanup which one the
court chooses is merely fortuitous because the "damages" for the
the same-the cost to restore the property to
property damage remains
23
its original condition. 0
The reasoning of Aviex is compelling. Since the property damage
is the same and the cost to restore is the same whether the government
cleans up and sues the insured for reimbursement or the government
orders the insured to clean up, it is preferring form over substance to
allow coverage in the former but not the latter situation.
2. Expectations of the Parties
Missouri courts have held that insurance contracts should be read
in light of the reasonable and normal expectations of parties as to the
A federal
California has similar case law.'
extent of coverage.'
court sitting in California has found in this rule of law a straight
forward reason why a "clean up action" should be considered an action
for "damages" in a CGL.Y
At the time the CGLs were negotiated, reasoned the court, neither
the insured nor the insurers anticipated claims of this sort. °
SUPERFUND was not enacted until 1980. What the parties did
contemplate was that if the insured became legally obligated to pay for
the property damage inflicted by the insured, the insurer would
compensate the insured.2w The fact that the obligation is not in the

200. See supra text accompanying notes 86-90.
201. See supra text accompanying notes 82-84.
202. See supra text accompanying note 85.
203. See supra text accompanying notes 87-89.
204. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 594
S.W.2d 950, 953-54 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980).
205. Intel Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 692 F. Supp. 1171,
1189-90 (N.D. Cal. 1988).
206. Id at 1190.
207. Id-; Hapke, supra note 4 at 10395-96.
208. Intel, 692 F. Supp. at 1190.
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form of "legal damages" does not alter the fundamental nature of the
insured's obligation.m
210
Jones Truck Lines was responsible for the contaminated land.211
Jones contracted to have the dioxin-laden oil sprayed on the land.
Jones is legally obligated under SUPERFUND to pay for the damage.
Jones and the insurer probably did not consider how the payments
would be made if such an accident occurred. They probably did not
consider the difference between reimbursing the government for doing
the cleanup work and Jones paying to do the cleanup work itself. At the
time of contracting they probably only considered that if Jones had to
pay money for property damage, Transport would indemnify Jones. To
hold that the cost an insured incurs in cleaning up toxic substances
itself is "damages" would fulfill the expectations of parties such as Jones
and Transport upon entering the insurance agreement.
3. SUPERFUNDPolicy
One of the major purposes of Superfund is to promote the speedy,
cost-efficient cleanup of hazardous waste.212
Treating liability
imposed by a "response costs action" differently from liability imposed
by a "clean up action" would create a disincentive for the insured to
cooperate in the speedy, cost-efficient cleaning up of a site.21
In order to avoid the costs of litigation, federal and state governments often enter into a consent decree or settlement with an insured
responsible for contamination.2 4 These settlements often require the
insured to clean up the site. 5 If the term "damages" is construed to
include the "response costs action" but not the "clean up action," an
insured, knowing that his action of cleaning up the site would not be
covered by his insurer, would be disinclined to enter such a settlement. 2" The insured would doubtless refuse to enter into such a
settlement and wait for the government to sue them for response costs
incurred by the government in cleaning up the site.2 7 This would
only serve to delay the cleanup of the site, cause additional contamination, and increase the costs of dealing with hazardous waste for society
as a whole.

209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.

Id
See supratext accompanying notes 21-23.
See supra text accompanying note 21.
Hapke, supra note 4, at 10402.
I& at 10401-02.
Id at 10402.
Id
Id.
Id
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V. CONCLUSION
Jones failed to discuss the differences between a "response costs

action" and a "clean up action."

Nevertheless, the court in Jones

decided the case in harmony with Missouri case law. If Missouri courts
are given the opportunity to decide this issue, they should decide the
issue as it was decided in Jones.
With the passage of the Missouri certified question rule,2 18 the
Supreme Court of Missouri is likely to have the opportunity to rule
dispositively on whether the term "damages" in a CGL includes cleanup
costs. SUPERFUND litigants in federal courts will probably be eager
to certify the state law question to the Supreme Court of Missouri. In
deciding the question, the court will have two recent federal decisions
on the issue to turn to for guidance-Jones and NEPACCO. NEPACCO
was rendered closer to home, but Jones is more consistent with Missouri
case law. The court in Jones construed the term "damages" to include
claims for response costs as a Missouri court would. The outcome of
Jones shows the court's belief that "damages" include costs incurred by
an insured in cleaning up contamination.
Tim BURNS

218. Mo. REv. STAT. § 477.004 (Supp. 1989).
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